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See Logistics.
In reading Tom Clancy's account of the Gulf Air War, Every Man a Tiger, he repeated an interesting quote. Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics. The bulk of Sickles' Hole is about tactics. For one page, let's assume that war is about putting more men on the field than the enemy, feeding them, providing them with more weapons, and ammunition. If war is about getting there firstest with the mostest, let's spend one web page looking at it from the perspective of the guy in charge of the wagon trains.
From that perspective, here is a brief procedural history of the entire Civil War. We'll come back to Gettysburg, but first a larger perspective.
I confess I have a bone to pick. Grant is in some circles hailed as a genius for switching from a strategy of conquest to a strategy of giant raids. OK, yes, this was a wonderful decision, and I have no trouble with Grant being praised for it. However, some historians dismiss Lee's strategic vision. While Lee won battles, he did not create an earth shaking change in strategy. Not entirely untrue. Still, yet other historians criticize Lee's Gettysburg campaign, as being nothing but a large raid.
That's where I get a bit annoyed. Grant is a genius for implementing a large raid strategy in 64 and 65, but Lee has no strategic vision as he tried it in 63? This is fair to the extent that it worked for Grant, but did not work for Lee. Why didn't it work for Lee? Let's talk about logistics, raiding, and the advantages of having exterior lines at a strategic level.
PROCEDURE western_war_union(INPUT human_beings, wealth_of_nation ;
OUTPUT death, destruction)
Take and Hold Strategy
{
REPEAT
{
Advance to take away southern territory.
Fight battle.
IF (win battle)
{
Advance further into southern territory.
Take men from army to guard supply lines.
Ask Washington for enough men to both win battles and
guard logistics train.
}
ELSE
{
Retreat back closer to base of supply.
Move men from guarding now shorter
supply line to fighting battle.
Demand enough men to both win battles and
guard logistics train.
}
} UNTIL (strategy switched from taking territory to raiding.)
Raid Based Strategy
REPEAT
{
March away from battle, toward lightly defended rear area.
FOR (everything in sight)
{
IF (of military value)
{
IF (can carry it away)
{
Loot.
}
ELSE (can not carry it away)
{
Destroy.
}
}
ELSE (not of military value)
{
IF (local population is supporting guerilla warfare)
{
Burn.
}
}
}
} UNTIL (reach rear of Richmond and supply route for Lee's army.)
Watch in disgust as effete useless eastern army gets
credit for Lee's surrender and winning war.
March to Washington DC.
Victory parade.
}
A Good Situation for Raiding Sheridan burning the Shenandoah Valley illustrates a decent situation for loot and burn big army strategic raiding. The opponent isn't a major threat. He was defeated before the raid started. A rearguard action keeps him from pushing battle. If he really wants to fight, Sheridan could do so with few supply difficulties. The Confederate force, even on its own turf, has the greater supply difficulty. They are marching in pursuit, over ground already burned.
A Better Situation for Raiding For much of the war, having interior lines on a strategic scale was an advantage for the South. If they were in trouble in the west, they could shift troops from the east much quicker than the Union could respond. Interior lines means faster shifting of forces and quicker communications. Grant had to counter this ability to shift troops by keeping all his armies active on all the fronts. Armies were kept too busy where they were to consider helping anyone else.
The bad news is that when Sherman got a strong army to the middle of the internal lines, no matter which way he went there was a Union supply point. Even if the South had scratched together enough men to force a battle, he could change course, head to another supply point, skirmish with rearguards, and otherwise loot, destroy and burn.
PROCEDURE eastern_war(INPUT human_beings, wealth_of_nation ;
OUTPUT death, destruction)
{
REPEAT
{
Spend months supplying and training huge army.
One army moves into other side's territory.
Both armies loot local countryside.
Huge battle. Men and materials destroyed in large amounts.
IF (invading army)
{
Must retreat towards base to resupply.
}
ELSE (defending army)
{
Announce great victory to press.
}
IF (winter)
{
Spend extra months supplying and training huge army.
}
} UNTIL (that "mean cuss" Grant arrives.)
A Less than Optimal Raid Grant once ordered Sheridan to put his army south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Here, Lee has the disadvantage of strategic interior lines. Once he invades the North, there is only one direction he can move towards to gather supplies. Once Meade threatens battle, Lee must concentrate to battle, and the raiding for food stops. The army starts getting hungry. Once a battle is forced, unless it is a very quick and easy victory, Lee will deplete his ammunition. At that point, a retreat back south is necessary.
Gettysburg was tactically a draw. Lovely ground, initiative, leadership, morale, maneuver, training and weapons all came out a wash. When the death and destruction stopped, neither side was in condition to press an attack and destroy the other army. Logistically, Lee was in the hazardous position. Meade could rest and resupply in place. Lee needed to move. There was only one direction he could move. If the Union army had been in better condition, Lee might not have made it back south.
IF (union_army)
{
Expand logistics to support continuous field operations.
}
REPEAT
{
Fight battle, cause death and destruction.
IF (union army)
{
logistics train replaces losses.
Shift to the left to threaten Richmond.
IF (recent victory by western army)
{
Fire 100 gun salute into enemy works.
Logistics train replaces the 100 rounds.
}
}
ELSE
{
logistics train attempts to replace losses.
Shift to the right to cover Richmond.
}
} UNTIL (Lee Surrenders)
IF (union army)
{
March to Washington DC.
Victory Parade.
}
}
The above assumes one is seeking victory by destroying the enemy's infrastructe necessary to the waging of war. There are other approaches. One could attempt to destroy the enemy's war fighting capability. To some degree Grant tried this, bleeding the southern army through continuous battle. One could try to destroy the enemy's will to fight. The South attempted this. Their best hope was to convince the voters to vote Lincoln out of office in 1864.
Arguably, it all fell apart for the South at once. The will to fight, the economy and the armies collapsed together. Morale and attrition played a significant role. Still, if one is looking for a strategic plan for the defeat of the south, it is the destruction of infrastructure through large raids that gives the best perspective on northern doctrine.
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